By Dr Aron Hagos Tesfai
Since mid-2022, transnationally connected Eritrean refugees and second-generation diaspora youth have been mobilizing coordinated waves of protests in the major cities of Western countries against the Eritrean authoritarian regime’s repressive practices at home and in the diaspora. Most of the protests have culminated in violent confrontations with police and loyalists of the Eritrean authoritarian regime. The pro-democracy protesters called the Blue Revolution (Brigade N’Hamedu in Tigrigan) targeted events billed as ‘cultural festivals’ but organized by the Eritrean embassy and loyalists. The first of these continuing protests against the long arms of the regime in the diaspora took place in Giessen, Germany, in August 2022. The police reported the use of excessive force by the protesters, which resulted in the injuries of 33 people, including 7 police. [1][2], but it did not draw much attention. The same violent protest occurred again a year later in Giessen, Germany. During July 2023, about 1,000 officers, a water cannon, and helicopters were deployed in the city to control and calm the protesters. This incident was reported by major international media houses: BBC, CNN, Aljazeera, AP News, and France24, to mention a few of them, and it also drew the attention of local and national politicians and governments [3] [4] [5]. Still, the protests under #BlueRevolution are continuing in various places with much traction and bigger goals. however, the media description of the protests is heavily skewed toward the violent component of it and the consequences, such as injuries to police and protesters, damage to infrastructure, and actions taken by police and local authorities. Furthermore, the media also reports politicians’ and authorities’ views, reflecting the generalized and quick views on migrants, depicting them as ungrateful migrants breaking the rules of the host communities.
Except for a few journalists, activists, and academics who closely follow the Eritrean diaspora and East African politics, major media houses failed to clarify why young Eritrean diaspora are involved in violent protests, how they opted to that end, what they are demanding, and who they are. There is no mention of the engagement approaches that preceded the protests and less is covered about the transnational repression they have been enduring. hence, bystanders picture them as a violent group with little regard for the rule of law including some Eritreans. Thus, this opinion piece, based on participant observations will clarify why the pro-democracy Eritrean diasporas are protesting against the repressive regime. Hopefully, it will clarify the confusing narrative that is circulating, which is partly due to a lack of information, generalization, and politicization of migrants issue, and partly due to the propaganda of the Eritrean authoritarian regime.
Why are they involved in ‘violent’ protests?
The explosion of protests is mainly against the transnational repression of the Eritrean regime and its diaspora institutions. The Eritrean regime has been organizing cultural festivals in Western countries for decades, however, the events and other mechanisms have been means of raising funds, scoring political gains, and enforcing transnational repression. The protesters’ goal is to drain the regime’s fertile source of income and expose the illegal activities of its institutions and loyalists who persistently abuse the democratic system of the host countries. For a long time, diaspora opposition activists have been informing and warning, formally and informally, local authorities and the international community about the extraterritorial coercive activities of the regime and the fear it spread among the Eritrean diaspora community, particularly among those who oppose it. However, this has very insignificant results. In recent years, determined transnationally connected groups of youth, refugees, and second-generation Eritreans have been campaigning to pressure the international community and host countries to intervene and prevent the regime’s transnational repression.
Since the Giessen 2022 protest, the activists and organizers of the protests have been following two approaches: an engagement approach (Plan A) that entails informing and engaging local authorities and police, and in some cases petitioning, or filing in courts—which worked only in a few cases. However, when plan A did not work, the activists resorted to what they had drawn as plan B: mobilizing protests and marches to the venue of the events. Thus, similar protests occurred in several EU countries, as well as in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel, and Australia [6]. During the demonstrations, angry young protesters were seen to surpass the police blockades and clash with police. Then the protestors disrupted the events by engaging in physical confrontations, including fistfights and using objects like stones, sticks, and bottles, against the regime’s supporters. In Iseal, the worst yet, the overwhelmed police used fire aminations to disperse protesters. As a result, numerous casualties, including police officers, and a significant number of Eritreans from both sides were jailed and properties were damaged, including police cars [7]. However, in a few places, e.g., London, UK,the activists successfully intervened with local authorities and courts to avert the events without resorting to physical conflict.
Who are the protesters?
Over the last twenty years, the Eritrean diaspora opposition movements have actively participated in transnational political movements and civil society groups, primarily for the protection of human rights and democratizing their homeland. Violent demonstrations are not known among the Eritrean diaspora, which is largely considered a peaceful and smoothly integrating community [8]. The demonstrations in the diaspora against the regime and even engagements with its supporters have been peaceful so far. So what has changed?
Most of the members of the Blue Revolution are recent refugees and second-generation Eritrean diaspora youth. The protests are organized under the name of Brigade N’Hamedu, or Blue Revolution. The phrase Brigade N’hamedu is in Tigrigna (one of the major languages in Eritrea) and is used to identify the group and characterize its features. Brigade N’Hamedu (BNH) can roughly be translated or equated to a group of people with militaristic features (hence Brigade) to liberate the homeland (for the soil = N’hamedu). It is militaristic because it is action-oriented and organized into a chain of commands (at least in its initial stages) to mobilize quick responses. The word N’hamedu (for his or her soil or homeland, a very common word in Tigrigna) adds another meaning, showing courage, determination, and sacrifices for the protection or liberation of the homeland (or other rightfully belonging possessions or democratic rights in the host or adaptation country). Another important signifier of the Blue Revolution is the blue flag. They wave the blue flags instead of the official state flag of Eritrea. The blue flag was originally the flag of the autonomous region of Eritrea (1952–1961) during its federation with Ethiopia. It was the only flag ratified by the Eritrean parliament of that time, rather than the state of Eritrea flag chosen by the single party ruling Eritrea since 1994. Thus, they use the blue flag to reject the non-elected, non-constitutional, and non-parliamentarian Eritrean dictatorship and its self-made flag. The adoption of the blue flag, the one sanctioned by the representatives of the people, accords with the ultimate goal of the Blue Revolution – regime change i.e., ending the dictatorship in Eritrea and replacing it with parliamentarian democracy. The blue flag had been used by liberation movements and other oppositions as well; now it has become a unifying sign and call to all the diaspora oppositions for solidarity.
Why coordinated protests now?
Eritrea, a nation that gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, is characterized as a militaristic authoritarian regime that has not conducted a general election since then. The exclusive political party in Eritrea is the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), led by President Isaias Afwerki. The UN reported that crimes against Humanity have been committed in Eritrea since 1991 and Eritrean authorities are responsible for the crimes committed inside Eritrea. Outside of its borders, the Eritrean government and its loyalists have been involved in consistent and widespread utilization of harassment and intimidation against Eritrean human rights defenders in the diaspora[1]. Then, what different factors can be attributed as triggering the current waves of mobilization?
The factors for the recent escalation of the Blue Revolution protests are multifaceted; BHN can be described largely as a continuation of the diaspora Eritrean opposition movements. In the past decade few transnationally connected Eritrean diaspora movements have emerged, for example, the Global Yialk Movement (Yiakl = Engouh) that came after the deceiving peace agreement between President Isaias Afeworki and PM Abie Ahmed of Ethiopia in 2018. Similarly, some factors related to recent developments in Eritrea and the region as a whole can be considered as triggering the Blue Revolution.
- 1. The Worsening Repression in Eritrea
For the past three decades, Eritrea has seen the most repressive regime and fought wars with each of its nears at different times. During the recent Tigray War (from November 2020 to November 2022), Eritrea sided with the federal government [10], and to build up its military capacity the Eritrean regime intensively rounded former members of the military forces who deserted regiments and young teenagers and adults as new recruits [11]. This is not a new practice in Eritrea, and it has been a modus operandi to pressure, jail, and punish (either financially or by confiscating government coupons) significant family members of those individuals who went into hiding or refused to join the military. This time, the security agents confiscated the livestock of families and sealed the homes of entire families until the conscripts handed themselves to authorities. Thus, family members, mostly parents, wives, and grandparents, were either jailed or their homes were sealed and left outside, and their livestock was taken. The BBC reported that “in the capital, Asmara, round-ups are being carried out on the streets, while in many rural areas, the authorities have sealed homes, confiscated cattle, and harassed relatives if a wanted person is not found (BBC, 12 October 2022).
This worsening repression amalgamated with very poor socioeconomic conditions at home has upset the relational mechanisms that had previously forced those abroad to keep their anti-regime sentiments private. Many of the youth involved in the Blue Revolution were in the silent majority group and started openly opposing the regime, breaking their fears. Then sentiments saying the worst things are happening to their families at home and what is worse than that could happen to them in the diaspora have been growing.
2. The Eritrean regime’s diaspora policy and the Tigray war
The Eritrean regime’s diaspora policy is known for its transnational repression and conflict transmission employed to exploit the diaspora for financial and political gains. There is ample evidence revealing practices of transnational repression by the Eritrean regime [12] [13]. The country’s economy relies heavily on diaspora remittances, ensuring the subsistence of the population and sustaining the state itself [14]. The Eritrean regime employs various transnational repressive activities to exert control, coerce, and exploit the diaspora [15]. Furthermore, events such as political conferences, cultural festivals, fundraising, and music concerts are continuously organized where higher officials of the Eritrean government deliver political seminars and propaganda. Moreover, the loyal supporters of the regime in the diaspora have been campaigners for defending and cleansing the wrong deeds of the regime and its gross human rights violations against the Eritrean people and others in the region. Furthermore, its embassy and loyalists of the regime intimidate and coerce the diaspora to pay a two percent diaspora tax, contribute funds at events, and participate in demonstrations to support the policies of the regime or denounce institutions exposing its crimes.
Moreover, during the Tigray War, the Eritrean regime’s diaspora supporters have been organizing events such as festivals and music concerts to raise funds for the war and mobilize diaspora supporters to defend and cleanse the name of the regime from international community watchdogs. Furthermore, the events were used to stage hate campaigns against the Tigray people, including the Eritrea diaspora opposition activists who condemned the participation and crimes committed by the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) in Tigray. The Eritrean opposition activists are defamed as traitors, non-nationals, and agents outsiders. For example, in the recent Tigray war, opposition activists openly condemned the EDF atrocities and crimes against humanity in Tigray and pledged their support to the Tigrayan people. So, smeared campaigns have been taking place to ostracize the opposition activists and divide the opposition groups. Social media loyalists of the regime have been threatening and intimidating pro-democracy activists who opposed the Tigray war.
Thus, the regime loyalists’ unfettered support during the Tigray War and their intensive transnational repression in the diaspora have made pro-democracy activists more determined to challenge and root out them from their places of refuge. The supporters’ loyalty to the regime was at the expense of the suffering and humanitarian crimes in Eritrea and Tigray and shows the disregard for the lives of Eritrean conscripted soldiers who perished in the war, whom the regime has not yet named. During the Tigray War, the supporters of the regime intensified hate campaigns toward the Tigray people. Furthermore, the festivals of the regime have become events for militarizing the diaspora community and terrorizing the opposition. Thus, BNH is born from discussions of totally immobilizing the enabling institutions and loyalists of the regime in the diaspora. Furthermore, making them dysfunctional was seen as significant for establishing a strong, unified diaspora opposition with the purpose of regime change. On top of that, the long years of efforts and political awareness campaigns to change the hearts of the supporters were unfruitful. Thus, a consensus was also growing on changing the strategies and confronting the supporters of the regime and their illegal activities in democratic countries. Legal actions against the supporters, for example, exposing those who were wrongly granted refugee and citizenship in the Western countries claiming experiences of human rights abuse but continued to support the regime they escaped. Furthermore, there are discussions on how to close institutions (community centers and churches), exposing illegal activities of collecting money, social media hate campaigns, and fund-raising events used to finance wars and the oppressive system. These are persisting as the immediate objectives of BNH.
3. Youth-focused social media activism
Eritrean refugees survived state-sponsored repression, fear, compliance, and distrust under continuous surveillance, coercion, and manipulation. This context was exported by the regime to the diaspora, which exacerbated the fear and mistrust among the recent young refugees. These contributed to their alienation and disengagement or ambivalence toward their homeland politics [16]. In this regard, social media activists played a significant role in breaking the fear and silence of many.
Many activists (in Tigrigna Teqalesti or Deleyti Fithi—fighters for justice or justice seekers) used different social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, TikTok, and Club House. Their activism targeted youth and campaigned to position the youth at the center of the diaspora political movement. In this regard, noticeable work of activism, individually and collectively, focusing on re-orienting the diaspora to the democratic system, values, and ideals, including democratic rights, institutionalism, the roles of citizenship in safeguarding democracy, the why and how of the diaspora political movement, and what the democratic future of Eritrea should look like have been ongoing. The youth were encouraged to protest as it is a civil right of individuals and a tool to draw attention and involve local and international communities, it is unfortunate many of them ended up in violence. However, BNH organizers have been engaging local authorities and police on the issues of transnational repression and the hidden agendas of the so-called ‘cultural festivals’.
4. Transnational Practices within the Eritrean Diaspora Opposition
How can the Eritrean diaspora’s opposition political practices contribute to the upraising of the Blue Revolution? Studies have shown that the Eritrean diaspora opposition is fragmented, and experiences of frequent reformation, division, and temporary cessation have been characteristic of established organizations and movements. This can be attributed to historical divisions, particularly between the liberation movements, and the lack of political culture within the larger Eritrean society. The Eritrean diaspora opposition has been mostly driven by the older generation of migrants and liberation movements veterans who are known for their political differences. Furthermore, the position of the Ethiopian government (driven by the TPLF) in the politics of Eritrea has been a dividing element in the diaspora opposition for a long time. Some political parties and movements see Ethiopia as an ally and resource in removing the Eritrean regime. However, others see it as an enemy that cannot be trusted, particularly the Tigrayan political elites. The recent Tigray war continues to be a dividing element among the diaspora opposition movements. Therefore, the diaspora opposition movements and political parties have been unattractive to the youth. Furthermore, the older generation has been antagonistic toward the young refugees. The Tigrigna term Nai Himamey is commonly used to describe the recently migrated refugees, describing them as a negligent and irresponsible generation that lacks interest in the political affairs of their home country. Despite the noticeable absence of the youth in the diaspora opposition movements, some concerned diaspora activities campaigned, focusing on the youth and how they should participate in and own the diaspora political movements, which contributed to the rise of the Blue Revolution.
5. International community
Transnational political contexts show how immigrants and diaspora mobilization can be facilitated by supranational institutions, including the UN, UNHCR, UNHRC, and the international community at large. Since 2016, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in Eritrea has been reporting that crimes against humanity have been committed in Eritrea since 1991 and found reasonable grounds to believe that Eritrean authorities had committed crimes against humanity. In the 2023 annual report, the CIO reported that there were no indications that the Eritrean authorities were willing to implement the recommendations made by the COI to address these grave human rights abuses. However, the international community (IC) has failed the Eritrean people, letting the officials of the regime continue their crimes without any accountability [17]. The diaspora opposition views this from two different angles. On one side, the viewers say that despite the documented gross human rights violations in Eritrea and the regime’s meddling in regional politics, the IC preferred to ignore the regime, obscuring the value of universal human rights and cooperation because world politics prioritize interests, so the interests of world powers are either protected by the regime (or at least not affected by it) or there is no gain for them to intervene. The second view is grounded in the lack of a collective Eritrean opposition entity that could collaborate with the international community for sociopolitical change in Eritrea. Despite continued attempts to forge a unifying body that represents the Eritrean diaspora opposition, it has not been successful. Therefore, BNH understood the role of the international community in Eritrean politics, but the opposition has to be unified and collaborate with the IC. So, the Blue Revolution is a demonstration to the IC that a unified pro-democracy movement is in the making.
Concluding remarks
The Blue Revolution is a sign of determination born from anger with the Eritrean regime’s repression in both at homeland and host countries, and is expression of solidarity with the people of Eritrea, who are suffering under the dictatorship of Isaias Afewerki. The protests are also a way of asserting their identity and voice as Eritreans who care about the fate of their homeland and their fellow citizens. Furthermore, the unfortunate violence during protests is a manifestation of frustration boiled over by the overwhelming transnational repression and unheard cries. But the ultimate aim of the Blue Revolution is to overtake the legitimacy and authority of the Eritrean regime at home and abroad. BNH as future citizens or already citizens of their hosts, they are aware of the democratic values and are exercising them for their purpose—halting translational repression and democratizing their homeland. The number of women activists and organizers, including the number of second-generation Eritreans, is increasing, which was something missing from the diaspora opposition. Moreover, the representatives of the movement are continually engaging with local society, government officials, and parliamentarians of host countries, including EU parliamentarians and the State Department. Further, there are discussions on how to maintain and expand the attention received from the international community and media, including building a unifying alternative political entity of the opposition and collaborate with the IC. More importantly, discussion on avoiding confrontations with police is ongoing, and engagements are always first approach. The youth-led Blue Revolution has a game changer in Eritrean diaspora politics. Will the old chasms and dogmas that have been weakening and dividing the diaspora movements pose a challenge to BNH? Yes, but the main issue is how to overcome them, be it infiltration from the regime, regionalism, perspectives on the liberation struggle, alliances, particularly with the Tigray people, etc.
Reference
[1] “Excess of violence”: protest against “dictator festival” in Gießen escalates—Teller Report
[2] Gießen: Kritiker des Eritrea-Festivals- Grüne stellen sich geschlossen hinter Grothe (giessener-allgemeine.de)
[3] At least 22 officers injured in the German town of Giessen following unrest – police | CNN
[4] Police say 22 officers have been injured during unrest at Eritrean festival in Germany | AP News
[5] Giessen Eritrea festival clashes leave 26 police officers injured – BBC News
[6] Hundreds of Eritrean opposition supporters arrested in Stuttgart – BBC News
[7] Israel: Netanyahu wants immediate deportation of Eritreans after Tel Aviv violence – BBC News
[8] Eritrea: The violence of the diaspora has its roots clearly in the homeland (nzz.ch)
[9] Eritrea: human rights situation remains dire amid complete impunity | UN News
[10] Ethiopia-Tigray war: who is fighting and what has been the toll? | Ethiopia | The Guardian
[11] Eritreans hunted down as military call-up intensifies over Ethiopia’s Tigray war – BBC News
[12] Belloni, M. (2021). Remittance Houses and Transnational Citizenship: Mapping Eritrea’s Diaspora–State Relationships. Africa Spectrum, 56(1), 59-80. https://doi.org/10.1177/00020397211003101.
[13] Marlies Glasius (2018) Extraterritorial authoritarian practices: a framework, Globalizations, 15:2, 179-197, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2017.1403781.
[14] Hirt, N., & Mohammad, A. S. (2021). Eritrea’s self-reliance narrative and the remittance paradox: Reflections on thirty years of retrogression. Remittances Review, 6(1), 21-39. https://doi.org/10.33182/rr.v6i1.1056
[15] Eritrea’s ‘diaspora tax’ is funding violence and oppression | Opinions | Al Jazeera
[16] Refugees and citizens: Understanding Eritrean refugees’ ambivalence towards homeland politics – Milena Belloni, 2019 (sagepub.com)
[17] No end in sight: International community continues to fail Eritreans says UN Expert | OHCHR.
Aron Hagos Tesfai – a post-doctoral researcher at the School of Applied Human Science, University KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Diaspora politics and Human Rights Activist. aribanov@gmail.com Twitter (X) – AronT (@aribanob ) https://x.com/Aribanob